CEACOP Seminar

Max Weber believed that the Occident produced a set of unique institutions whose distinctiveness could be characterized in terms of their type and degree of rationalization. The rise of modern capitalism, one element within this set, had been enabled by the presence of other elements, he famously argued, none of which had indigenously arisen anywhere else in the world. This presentation reconstructs Weber’s idea of the Occident and examines how he understood the place of his own “modern European cultural world” within the development of Occidental rationalism. It also considers the ways in which Weber’s comparative project might have been contaminated by various forms of Eurocentric biases, such as cultural prejudices, misapprehensions of Western uniqueness, and inept applications of the ideal-typical method.

This paper explores “hé (和)” as a concept cluster of harmony in early China. “Hé” is translated “harmony” almost without exception in modern English but what “hé” could imply in early China was much larger than what we think of the concept of harmony today. “Hé” was used to refer to well-cooked dishes blended with various ingredients, to musical harmony created by different instruments, to a balanced physical or mental condition, to a harmonious climate, and etc. The broad spectrum of “hé” was gradually narrowed down to the meaning of harmony associated with music but it was not narrowed down to that of the musical harmony we usually think of today, namely, the mathematical relationship between musical sounds. When emphasizing the mathematical aspect of music, “harmony” refers to a hierarchical system in which other tones must follow the tonic or the keynote that produces them. In recent studies, “hé” is seen as a blend of two conflicting ideas, namely, musical and culinary harmony. Considering these studies, I would suggest a more nuanced understanding of this distinction. Music and food metaphors cohabited from the very beginning of the word “hé” and this concept became increasingly important in relation to the social demands of balance, coordination and unity in the age of philosophical debates. In this process, Confucian and Daoist thinkers developed their own way to read these metaphors with different emphasis. In other words, it is not that Confucians favored musical harmony and Daoist prefer culinary harmony, but that they developed different philosophical positions on the concept cluster of harmony, already understood by the metaphor of music and food.

Just Cause in Early China: A Comparative Analysis of Warfare Ethics
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This paper attempts to revisit some of the unaddressed issues of our book, Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and Dissent (Routledge 2015). Contemporary Chinese scholars of military ethics often assert cultural relativism. They declare that the just war ethics of the West is part of Western culture. Chinese culture, in which Chinese military ethics is embedded, however, is very different from Western culture. Hence the Chinese military is to be normatively guided by traditional Chinese values. This is a microcosm of what is called “Cultural Confidence” by both the Chinese government and by some Chinese classics scholars. This article attempts to refute this cultural relativism by an in-depth analysis of the classical articulations of just cause in early China and by comparing them with the classical understanding of just cause in medieval and early modern Europe. Going back to the classical age, both the Confucian School and the Military Strategy School put more emphasis on offense-oriented just causes – (i) retributive justice against the wicked ruler, (ii) rectifying justice on behalf of the oppressed, (iii) just revolt, and (iv) preventive war. The defense-oriented just cause (self-defense against actual aggression) recedes into an inconspicuous corner. In contrast, the Daoist and Mohist Schools conceive just cause strictly as defense against actual aggression. Contemporary Western understanding of just war is heavily indebted to Michael Walzer’s theory, which stresses the defense-oriented just cause. In the early history of just war ethics in Europe, however, the offense-oriented just causes were very prominent. The four offense-oriented just causes of early China were articulated by a number of European just war thinkers from High Middle Ages to early modern Europe. Hence there is a substantial overlapping consensus between Chinese and Western classical understandings of just cause in their respective formative period. With the proper acknowledgment of this substantial overlapping consensus, China and the West would have plenty of common ground to retrieve, refine, and reformulate cross-cultural moral norms in warfare for today’s world.

Ping-cheung Lo

The Division of Educational Labour Between Confucian Education and Political Liberalism
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A political liberal government must be supported by just citizens, but how should the just citizens be educated? Political liberals have offered two answers: (i) the government cultivates people to be ethically autonomous, and (ii) the government teaches people civic virtues by freestanding citizenship curriculum. This paper rejects both answers. (i) would cause sectarianism because it inevitably assumes a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (ii) is incomplete because, although citizenship curriculum is not tied to any comprehensive doctrines, it is unclear why citizens should value civic virtues over comprehensive moral virtues. I offer the third solution. While the government keeps neutral and offers citizenship curriculum that teaches civic virtues, the cultural groups in the civil society promote comprehensive moral virtues that can strengthen civic virtues. By delegating some educational burdens to cultural groups, the government avoids sectarianism but still enjoys the support from just citizens motivated by comprehensive moral virtues. Furthermore, by discussing Huang Zongxi’s Waiting for the Dawn, I suggest a form of Confucian “school” that educates people to develop a sense of vigilance and a willingness to engage in public deliberation. This example shows that the role of cultural groups in civic education should not be underestimated.

Baldwin Wong

Can Confucianism Meet Contemporary Challenges in Hong Kong?
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Confucian principle and policy toward minorities can be characterized as a sort of Gai Tu Gui Liu in that it uses the institution of Confucian culture to assimilate minorities and replace hereditary local rulers with centrally appointed officials. It is in the DNA of Chinese political civilization, a powerful force that even exists today as it comes to terms with contemporary Hong Kong. Since it reclaimed its sovereignty twenty-two years ago Beijing’s undertakings in Hong Kong could be reinterpreted as a revival of Gai Tu Gui Liu practice. The 2015 Student Occupation Movement and the 2019 protest against the extradition law, by contrast, can be seen as a localization movement against such a practice. We might ask, then, does his Confucian framework of Gai Tu Gui Liu offer us a new perspective on Hong Kong’s fundamental conflict between democratic self-rule and China’s “mainlandization”? Can it be even workable in today’s Hong Kong? And what might be the fundamental limits of both old and new Gai Tu Gui Liu policy? This talk will explore the conceptual issues around the case of Gai Tu Gui Liu in Hong Kong, and through this the larger question of whether Confucianism can address contemporary issues like self-rule and autonomy versus assimilation and Confucian great unification culture which Hong Kong faces. In doing so, I offer my reflections on the place of Confucianism studies in Hong Kong. .

Baogang He

A Han Feizian Worry with Confucian Meritocracy – and a Non-Moral Alternative
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The most prominent advocacy of political meritocracy in recent years has come from those who see themselves inspired by the Confucian philosophical tradition. Unfortunately, they often ignore competing Chinese visions of political meritocracy and direct challenges to the Confucian vision from within the Chinese tradition. The Confucian conception of political merit is intertwined to its conception of morality and as such virtue is seen as an essential component. To defend such a position and its applicability, they need to show both that inculcation of virtue is possible and that these virtues are politically relevant. One prominent historic critic of Confucianism, Han Feizi, worries about both claims. While agreeing that political merit matters and that ministers and bureaucrats should be chosen on the basis of their merit, he has a vastly different conception of what constitutes politically relevant merit, one that is both is both task specific and amoral in nature. What Confucians fail to grasp, thinks Han Feizi, is that what leads to virtue is non-identical to what leads to a well-ordered, flourishing state. At times, a choice must be made between following morality and securing the state. Insofar as Confucianism requires moral virtue as a core component of merit, it not only misidentifies what constitutes politically relevant merit, it focuses on and characterizes as meritorious traits that are actually detrimental to a well-ordered and flourishing state.

Eirik Lang Harris

Legitimating the Early Modern State through Social Policy: England (1553-1750), Japan(1660-1891), and China (1683-1911)
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Studies of state formation in political science and sociology have often focused upon how and why states developed centralized institutions to extract revenues for fighting wars. But the research on state formation has paid scant attention to the process of legitimating state power. This neglect leaves social scientists few intellectual tools to make sense of the emergence and consolidation of the early modern state. In this project, I argue that the early modern state as an impersonal apparatus of governance was common to Tudor and early Stuart England, Tokugawa Japan, and Qing China. The personal charisma of the monarch or the divine source of the ruler’s power could no longer justify the state’s coercive power. Instead, state power was legitimated by public goods provision through various social policies. The public goods were closely connected to the general welfare of the subjects, which included famine relief, financing large-scale public works, as well as state reaction to popular petitions that touched on domestic welfare issues. I demonstrate a similar pattern of state-society negotiation based upon a commonly accepted concept of public welfare across these three cases, as well as the role of non-material public good in the transformation from early modern to modern politics in England and Japan, but not in China.

Wenkai He