# City University of Hong Kong Course Syllabus

# offered by Department of Economics and Finance with effect from Semester A 2022 /23

# Part I Course Overview

Course Title:	Topics in Microeconomics
Course Code:	EF5407
Course Duration:	1 semester
Credit Units:	3
Level:	P5
Medium of Instruction:	English
Medium of Assessment:	English
<b>Prerequisites</b> : (Course Code and Title)	EF5471 Advanced Microeconomics
<b>Precursors:</b> (Course Code and Title)	Nil
<b>Equivalent Courses:</b> (Course Code and Title)	Nil
<b>Exclusive Courses</b> : (Course Code and Title)	Nil

#### 1. Abstract

This course covers fundamental tools of game theory, information economics and mechanism design, and provides students with solid skills to analyse strategic situations. Concepts such as dominance, rationality, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, commitment, credibility, adverse selection, moral hazard and signalling will be discussed and applied to economic models, business cases and real-life examples drawn from economics, business, politics, sports and elsewhere.

The course also encourages discovery learning, which takes place when students use their knowledge and skills in game theory to discover solutions to problems in business and life.

#### 2. Course Intended Learning Outcomes (CILOs)

(CILOs state what the student is expected to be able to do at the end of the course according to a given standard of performance.)

No.	CILOs	Weighting	Discov	ery-enr	riched	
		(if	curricu	ılum rel	ated	
		applicable)	learnin	learning outcomes		
			(please	(please tick where		
			approp	appropriate)		
			Al	A2	A3	
1.	think strategically;	-	$\checkmark$			
2.	understand basic concepts in game theory, information	-	$\checkmark$			
	economics and mechanism design;					
3.	apply tools in game-theoretic analysis to identify the	-				
	"equilibrium" situations, i.e. strategies that are mutual best					
	responses for the players, in various types of games with					
	different temporal and information structures;					
4.	formalize real-life social, economic and business situations	-				
	as well as research questions related to economics, finance					
	and business strategy, into game-theoretic models in order					
	to explain observed strategic behaviours and/or recommend					
	strategies.					
				•	•	

A1: Attitude

Develop an attitude of discovery/innovation/creativity, as demonstrated by students possessing a strong sense of curiosity, asking questions actively, challenging assumptions or engaging in inquiry together with teachers.

A2: Ability

Develop the ability/skill needed to discover/innovate/create, as demonstrated by students possessing critical thinking skills to assess ideas, acquiring research skills, synthesizing knowledge across disciplines or applying academic knowledge to self-life problems.

A3: Accomplishments Demonstrate accomplishment of discovery/innovation/creativity through producing /constructing creative works/new artefacts, effective solutions to real-life problems or new processes.

#### 3. **Teaching and Learning Activities (TLAs)**

(TLAs designed to facilitate students' achievement of the CILOs.)

TLA	A Brief Description				Hours/week	
	-	1	2	3	4	(if applicable)
Lectures	The lectures introduce fundamental concepts in game theory, information economics and mechanism design to students and encourage them to think critically and logically, with the goal to guide students to develop their ability to solve new problems of economic strategy by themselves.	N	V	V	V	
Homework	Homework will largely consist of applications of the material discussed in class, in which students will be asked to apply the basic tools of game theory to analyze e.g. specific industry problems, business practices etc.	V	V	V	V	
Term Paper	Students need to write a term report on game theory, information economics, or mechanism design. The topic for the project can be, but not restricted to, any real-life application of game theory, information economics, or mechanism design.	V	~	V	V	

#### Assessment Tasks/Activities (ATs) 4.

(ATs are designed to assess how well the students achieve the CILOs.)

Assessment Tasks/Activities	CILO No.				Weighting	Remarks
	1	2	3	4		
Continuous Assessment: 100 %						
Midterm Examination	$\checkmark$	V	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	50%	3-hour written exam arranged towards the later weeks of the semester
Term Paper	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		30%	
Homework	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		20%	
Examination: 0 % (duration: , if applicable)						
					100%	

100%

# 5. Assessment Rubrics

(Grading of student achievements is based on student performance in assessment tasks/activities with the following rubrics.)

Assessment Task	Criterion	Excellent	Good	Marginal	Failure
		(A+, A, A-)	(B+, B)	(B-, C+, C)	(F)
1. Midterm		Strong evidence of original	Evidence of grasp of	Sufficient familiarity with	Little evidence of
Examination		thinking; good organization,	subject, some evidence of	the subject matter to	familiarity with the
2. Term Paper		capacity to analyse and	critical capacity and	enable the student to	subject matter; weakness
		synthesize; superior grasp of	analytic ability; reasonable	progress without	in critical and analytic
3. Homework		subject matter; evidence of	understanding of issues;	repeating the course.	skills; limited, or
		extensive knowledge base.	evidence of familiarity		irrelevant use of literature.
			with literature.		

Applicable to students admitted in Semester A 2022/23 and thereafter

# Applicable to students admitted before Semester A 2022/23

Assessment Task	Criterion	Excellent	Good	Fair	Marginal	Failure
		(A+, A, A-)	(B+, B, B-)	(C+, C, C-)	(D)	(F)
1. Midterm Examination		Strong evidence of original	Evidence of grasp of	Student who is	Sufficient familiarity	Little evidence of familiarity with the
	-	thinking; good organization,	subject, some evidence of	profiting from the	with the subject	subject matter;
2. Term Paper		capacity to analyse and	critical capacity and	university experience;	matter to enable the	weakness in critical and analytic skills:
3. Homework		synthesize; superior grasp	analytic ability;	understanding of the	student to progress	limited, or irrelevant
		of subject matter; evidence	reasonable understanding	subject; ability to	without repeating the	use of literature.
		of extensive knowledge	of issues; evidence of	develop solutions to	course.	
		base.	familiarity with literature.	simple problems in the		
				material.		

## Part III Other Information (more details can be provided separately in the teaching plan)

# 1. Keyword Syllabus

(An indication of the key topics of the course.)

- 1. Games with Simultaneous Moves and Complete Information
  - a. Normal-form Representation
  - b. Nash Equilibrium
  - c. Mixed Strategies
- 2. Games with Sequential Moves and Complete Information
  - a. Extensive-form Representation
  - b. Subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium
  - c. Repeated Game
  - d. Stationary Equilibrium
- 3. Games with Simultaneous Moves and Incomplete Information
  - a. Static Bayesian Games
  - b. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
  - c. Auctions
- 4. Games with Sequential Moves and Incomplete Information
  - a. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
  - b. Signalling
  - c. Cheap Talks

## 2. Reading List

## 2.1 Compulsory Readings

(Compulsory readings can include books, book chapters, or journal/magazine articles. There are also collections of e-books, e-journals available from the CityU Library.)

1.	Gibbons, R. (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton
2.	Salanie, B. (2005) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd edition, MIT press

## 2.2 Additional Readings

(Additional references for students to learn to expand their knowledge about the subject.)

1.	Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2004) Contract theory, MIT press
2.	Börgers, T. (2015) An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford
3.	Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991) Game theory, MIT press.
4.	Laffont, JJ. and D. Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives, Princeton
5.	Maschler, M., E. Solan, and S. Zamir (2013) Game Theory, Cambridge
6.	Myerson, R. B (1991) Game Theory, Harvard
7.	Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994) A Course in Game theory, MIT Press