Credit Claiming and Mayoral Delegation Preferences Amid a Migrant Crisis

Dr. Claudia N. Avellaneda
Associate Professor
Indiana University

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Zoom: Please sign up by 9pm HKT on April 11 using the QR code or the link below. Zoom details will be provided by email before the seminar.

Language: English

Abstract

When considering the delegation of managerial autonomy, executives assess their perceived credit-claiming opportunities against potential blame attribution’s costs, and these perceptions’ balance may shift under crisis. Meanwhile, the literature has explored delegation decision-making in contexts where delegators hold certain control powers over delegates, but not where such controls are absent. Amid one of the largest migrant crises worldwide, Ricardo A. Bello-Gomez (Texas Tech University) and I conducted a survey-experiment with 238 sitting Colombian mayors. We explore issue visibility, salience of decision beneficiaries, and policy stage (formulation vs. implementation) as drivers of mayors’ preferences for delegating to upper levels of government. Results reveal that mayors are less likely to delegate project implementation to the national government when presented with a more visible project. Neither visibility nor beneficiaries’ salience affects mayoral preferences for project formulation on its own. However, mayors are less likely to delegate both formulation and implementation when beneficiaries are more salient to their constituents.

Biography

Dr. Claudia N. Avellaneda is an associate professor in Indiana University’s O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. She specializes in governance and public management in developing countries, with an emphasis on decentralization, public policy, innovation, governance, and public management. Professor Avellaneda investigates determinants of government performance in Latin American local and subnational governments by focusing on the role of chief executives — the mayor and governor. Specifically, she explores the impact of mayors’ and governors’ education, experience, networking, and political support on social service delivery, public finances, tax collection, and decision-making. She has extended this line of research to Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Honduran, and Salvadoran municipalities. Currently, her research focuses on the Peruvian and Guatemalan municipalities.

Enquiries: Ms Janet Wu
Tel.: 3442-2158  Email: janet.wu@cityu.edu.hk