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Abstract:

Do electoral rules affect public goods provision? We take advantage of the experimental method to test the effect of FPTP vs. PR electoral rules in the context of Thailand's 2011 General Elections. Thailand uses a mixed electoral system and the electorate can cast two votes, one for an individual in a local constituency and one for a party at the national level. Do voters hold different expectations toward politicians elected on these two tiers? We explore this question using an experimental survey administered two weeks prior to the elections on a nationally-representative sample of 8,455 voters. We find that voters do assess candidates differently based on which electoral rules they are running under. Interestingly, voters tend to prefer candidates who espouse a policy uncharacteristic of their electoral type.

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(counter-type). Additionally, we find that party identity and the level of competitiveness are important modifiers.

1. Introduction

A wealth of studies in political science points to electoral rules as a significant determinant in the provision of public goods. Scholars have highlighted the effect of various features of electoral rules, such as district magnitude and the electoral formula, and explored a number of proxies for public goods provision, including government spending, policy types, and actual policy outcomes such as educational attainment or public health (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Persson and Tabellini 1999, 2003, 2004b, a, Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Gerring and Thacker 2001, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002, Franzese and Nooruddin 2004, Rickard 2005, 2009, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007, Thames and Edwards 2006, Edwards and Thames 2007, Hicken and Simmons 2008). The majority of these studies conclude that proportional representation (PR) rules (particularly closed list PR) with high district magnitudes tend to be associated with the highest levels of public goods provision. They reason that PR with high district magnitudes make politicians accountable to larger constituencies, making it more cost effective to distribute the government budget broadly rather than to target narrow groups.

Much of the theorizing and empirical testing of this logic has focused on the decisions and strategies of politicians. We know less about the role of the voter in this process. Do voters actively demand different policies under various electoral rules or are they simply passive actors, maximizing vote choice based on individual utility comparisons amongst candidates/parties? If they are non-passive actors, what logic do they utilize to make decisions? Do they make simple “type” decisions based on electoral rules, making our
predictions similar to those of politician-centered models? Or, do voters always prefer a certain kind of distribution (narrow or broad), regardless of the electoral rule in play? To what extent does partisanship shape voter preferences? Do voters prefer the same things from opposition candidates as they do from candidates from their own party? Answering these questions will help us unpack the accountability link between politicians and constituents and thus more fully understand the impact of electoral rules on public goods provision.

We explore these questions in the context of Thailand’s 2011 elections for the lower house (Saphaphutaenratsadorn), which utilized a mixed-member electoral system. Mixed-member systems, as the name suggests, contain politicians elected under two types of electoral rules, majoritarian and proportional representation (PR). In Thailand, 375 (75%) of the politicians in the lower house are elected under majoritarian rules with single-member constituencies and 125 (25%) on a single national PR list. The two tiers are parallel, that is, the distribution of seats in each tier is independent of the other. Voters cast two separate votes, one for an individual candidate for the constituency seat, and one for a party in the PR list-tier contest.

To explore the effect of electoral rules on voter preferences, we conducted a survey experiment on a sample of 8,455 Thai voters two weeks prior to the 2011 general elections. We presented respondents with a description of a hypothetical candidate and varied 1) whether the candidate was a constituency candidate or a list candidate, and 2) how the candidate said he would spend government resources. We then asked respondents to

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4 We did not vary the gender of the candidate in this experiment. Hence, we refer to the candidate as a ‘he’ throughout this paper.
indicate whether the information provided about the candidate made them more or less likely to vote for him. Comparing the average effects of these two treatments we find that electoral rules do indeed affect how voters think about the provision of public goods, but not in the way one might expect. Specifically, we find that Thai voters reward politicians based on what we call a counter-type strategy. When a candidate espouses a policy platform contrary to that normally expected by a candidate elected from that tier voters are more likely to support him. Voters generally expect party list MPs, as the leaders of the party, to be more focused on national policy and public goods provision, while constituency MPs are more focused on local public goods and constituency service. When candidates for these offices go against type—for example, if constituency candidates emphasize national public goods—voters tend to view those candidates more favorably.

Interestingly, however, these effects are not uniform across districts or parties. In swing districts voters tend to prefer candidates who offer targeted benefits, particularly candidates running on the party list. In non-swing districts voters prefer candidates, especially constituency candidates, who run on promises of public goods. Party identity is also an important modifier of voter preferences. The supporters of one of Thailand’s main parties (Pheu Thai) are especially keen to see the constituency MPs, regardless of candidates’ party affiliation, espousing public goods platforms. Conversely, the supporters of Thailand’s other major party (Democrat) respond positively to party list candidates’ promises of local public goods. Given that party systems vary substantially across countries the precise pattern of partisan results are country-specific, but they do underscore a more general point about the ways in which partisanship can shape voter preferences.

This study makes two important contributions, one methodological and one theoretical, to the literature on electoral rules. First, to our knowledge, this is the first
experimental test of the effect of electoral rules on public goods provision. Experiments, with their benefit of random assignment of the treatment, provide a much more powerful test of the theory than observational quantitative studies that rely mostly on cross-national variation in electoral rules. Second, this study is one of the first to test the role of the voter in public goods provision. The findings suggest that electoral rules do shape voter expectations regarding the type of government spending, but that other candidate, voter and district characteristics modify this effect in important ways.

2. The Voter, Electoral Rules and Public Goods Provision

There are several theoretical stories given for how electoral rules shape public goods provision. Each of them typically begins with rational politicians seeking to gain and maintain office. Then, some combination of district magnitude (the number of legislative seats available per electoral district), or the electoral formula (how votes are translated into seats), shapes the type of resource distribution (broad or narrow) politicians choose in order to maximize their electoral prospects. In most accounts, especially those using formal models, the voter has no preference over the type of resource distribution, but simply maximizes individual utility based on the policy decisions of politicians or parties.

Consider Persson and Tabellini’s (1999) classic account in which they argue that a combination of low district magnitude (single-member districts) and the plurality rule tend to make each party a sure winner in some of the districts, concentrating electoral competition

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5 Persson (2005) identifies this as a significant problem in cross-national quantitative studies and suggests an empirical strategy that relies on transitions to democracy and their accompanying introduction of new electoral rules to increase the within-country variation.
in a small number of pivotal districts. In this account politicians choose the type of spending to pursue based on electoral strategy. Only swing voters in swing districts make a difference in the model, and they simply choose the party that maximizes their individual utility. The model thus assumes that voters in those pivotal districts have a preference for narrowly targeted goods rather than a broad, programmatic spending policy. However, what are we to make of the preferences of voters in non-swing districts, or even non-swing voters in swing districts? Moreover, it is not hard to imagine a situation, the recent US general elections being a possible example, where even constituency MPs (members of the House) are held accountable for national policies. In short, the voter-politician link is under-theorized and remains untested in most accounts of electoral rules’ effect on public goods provision.

In other politician-centered accounts, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2004b) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001), scholars argue that the winner-takes-all property of the plurality rule essentially means that a ruling party only needs the support of 25% of the electorate (50% in 50% of the districts) compared to proportional representation which requires 50% of the national vote. Again the focus is on politicians’ policy preferences without reference to voter preferences. Persson and Tabellini, for example, state that under full PR “politicians have stronger incentives to internalize the policy benefits for larger segments of the population” (2004b, p.86). Similar politician-focused accounts include the argument that large district magnitudes spread benefits broadly across the entire nation because that is the only cost-effective way to reach all constituents (Franzese and Nooruddin 2004; Rickard 2005; Edwards and Thames 2007). Voter preferences over type of policy do not feature in the models; voters simply maximize their individual utility.
Voter-Centered Accounts

In comparison to the work on the way in which electoral rules shape party and politician preferences, there has been little work done on whether and how such rules also shape voter preferences and expectations over policy. Still, a review of what literature exists yields a number of potential testable hypotheses.

Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) are perhaps the most notable exception to neglect of voter preferences. In their model, society is composed of three social groups evenly distributed across the regions of a country. Voters have preferences over broad transfers or narrowly targeted goods. Under PR in a single national district spending on narrow goods is, on average, even across regions. Thus, the majority social group cannot increase its utility from narrow goods, but can do so by increasing broad transfers with a slight bias toward its group. Conversely, under majoritarian rules and assuming social groups are distributed identically in each constituency, the majority group wins in each constituency. Thus, voters in each district have identical preferences over transfers, but different preferences over narrow goods—preferring ones directed toward their own district.

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6 There is, of course, a rich literature on the effect of electoral rules on the incentives of voters to act strategically.

7 This line of thought has precedence in the American literature. In 1978 Fenno noted that it is often the case that voters have a dim view of Congress, yet believe their individual representative is doing a good job (the so-called “Fenno’s Paradox”). Representatives seem adept at separating their individual performance from collective views of Congress’s collective performance (Fenno 1978). Voters, for their part, do not appear to hold legislators accountable for their collective actions or inaction (Jacobson 2004). Various scholars have
A variant of this logic considers the effect of being in a swing district on voter preferences. Voters under majoritarian systems know the tendency of politicians to target swing districts and thus voters in the non-swing districts would prefer broad public goods. Alternatively, if swing districts are not static, i.e. different districts are pivotal in each election, then voters may prefer broad public goods knowing that in most elections they will lose out. In short, similar to the discerning party leaders in some accounts (McGillvray 2004; Stokes et. al. 2013) it is possible that voters’ preferences over policy are contingent on what kind of district there are in. In both these accounts we still expect voters under PR rules to prefer public goods.

The literature on economic voting provides us with a different expectation concerning voter preferences—though one that is independent of electoral institutions. Theories of economic voting posit that voters tend to make broad assessments of incumbent politicians’ success by analyzing personal financial situations and/or changes in the overall economy. A major implication of these economic voting theories is that voters punish and reward all politicians the same regardless of how the manner in which they are elected. If all voters’ utility function is made up of an identical combination of narrowly-targeted goods and broad, public goods then an increase in either that positively affects voters’ wellbeing will be rewarded at the ballot booth. As discussed above, this assumption seems to be what underlies the politician-focused accounts discussed above. Politicians choose strategies that shown that voters assess members of the House of Representatives differently than both the President and senators. This leads to the oft-cited statistic that individual members of the House have much higher approval ratings in their constituency than either the House as a total body, senators from the state, or the President.
Electoral Rules, Public Goods Experiment  

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will result in the most efficient distribution of resources to the constituents that elect them with the assumption being that any net increase in voter economic utility leads to continued or increased electoral support. In other words, voters have no preference over how governments spend money, regardless of electoral rules, as long as individual utility increases.

Voter Preferences under Mixed Member Systems

The literature we have reviewed focuses on preferences under a single set of electoral rules. However, since we are interested in exploring voter preferences under a mixed-member electoral system we need to consider the implications of voter policy preferences when MPs from the same body are elected under different rules. There is a large literature that examines the ways in which the mixed-member systems shape the incentives and behavior of candidates, politicians and parties (see for example, Shugart and Wattenberg 2003; Strautman and Baur 2002; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006; Hirano et. al. 2001; Ferrara 2004; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Moser and Scheiner 2004). If we accept, as most of this literature does, that politicians are rational actors, able to interpret the payoffs of various electoral rules, then why not voters? To what extent do voter preferences over policies vary depending on the type of electoral rules under which they are voting? Work in American politics has demonstrated that voters’ expectations and preferences vary across office type—they demand different things from their mayor than they do their member of Congress or the President, even when those politicians are from the same party (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). Do voters in mixed member systems do something similar? If so, what are the implications for policy making in such systems? While there is an

8 There is a well-developed literature on voter behavior in mixed-member systems that examines the conditions under which individual voters split their votes across different
abundance of studies of when and how party list and constituency candidates make different appeals to voters (e.g. Pekkanen et. al. 2005; Crisp 2007; Sieberer 2010), to our knowledge, there is no study about whether individual voter preferences over the type of appeals candidates make varies with whether the candidate is running for a party list or constituency seat.

We can imagine four distinct arguments about the way in which mixed member systems should shape voter preferences, each with a unique observable implication. For our purposes we label these Contamination, Office Type, Swing/Non-Swing, and Cross-Type.

1. Contamination: One possibility is that voters do not distinguish between constituency and PR candidates in terms of preferences over policy—they hold a preference for (a mix of) public and targeted goods that is independent of which tier a candidate is competing for. This is consistent with a large literature on mixed-member systems that explores contamination effects between the two tiers (Herron and Nishikawa 2001, Cox and Schoppa 2002, Moser and Scheiner 2004). Contamination effects have to do with the influence of one tier on outcomes and behavior in the second tier. Under certain conditions party list candidates will emphasize targeted policies as much as their constituency counterparts, while parties (e.g. Moser and Scheiner 2009; Karp et. al. 2001). Existing studies focus on the role that competitiveness and voter information play in shaping the incentives and capabilities of voters to strategically split their vote. These studies assume that voters have a fixed preference for a political party, but that they deviate from that preference in their constituency vote when they have information that the candidate from their preferred party is not competitive.
in other circumstances constituency candidates campaign on promises of broad public policies. To the extent this contamination logic holds for voters then we would expect voters to have similar policy preferences regardless of office type. The observable implication of this argument is that we should observe no significant differences in voter preferences across the two tiers.

2. **Office Type**: This argument holds that voters separate MPs into two different types, holding separate preferences regarding the policies supported by each type of MP. When casting their vote for the constituency candidate voters in mixed systems should exhibit preferences similar to voters in majoritarian systems, and when voting for the party list PR tier, they should behave like voters in PR systems. Drawing on the logic of Milesi-Ferretti et. al. (2002) voters should therefore prefer party list candidates who promise broad public goods, and constituency candidates who promise more targeted goods and services.

3. **Swing/Non-Swing**: Building on the discussion in the previous section it is quite possible that the level of competition within a district shapes voter preferences over policy promises. In majoritarian systems voters in competitive or swing districts can reasonably expect to be the recipient of targeted benefits and so should respond favorably to candidates who make such appeals. Voters in non-swing districts, on the other hand, expect to receive relatively fewer targeted benefits and so prefer candidates who promise broad public goods. Of course, in mixed member systems the situation is more complicated than this. How should we expect

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9 We are assuming here that voters cast two distinct votes, which they do in most, but not all, mixed member systems.
voters to view candidates for the party list tier? According to the office type argument voters should prefer party list candidates who promise public goods—there simply are no “swing” constituencies under a single national PR district. This is, we believe, incorrect. Voters in swing districts expect to be the recipients of targeted benefits and the type of candidate is simply irrelevant. They will respond positively to targeted appeals from either type of candidate. Similarly, voters in non-swing districts don’t expect to receive many targeted benefits and so prefer candidates who promise to provide public goods, regardless of type. (See Table 1).

4. Cross-Type. A final possibility is that voters actually prefer candidates that bring something different to the table. They may assume, for example, that all constituency candidates will do what they can to direct targetable goods to the constituency. Of course some candidates may be more or less credible in their promises to provide such goods, but all candidates make such promises. As a result, voters may respond favorably to candidates who set themselves apart from the competition by also making promises counter to their type—constituency candidates promising broad PGs, and party list candidates talking about providing pork or constituency service. Voters, in other words, reward candidates who cross tier boundaries and engage voter preferences over both broad and targeted policies. Table 1 summarizes the observable implications of each of these arguments.

[Table 1 about here]
Table 1: Voter Preferences in Mixed-member Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PR candidates</th>
<th>Constituency candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Contamination</td>
<td>No difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Office Type</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
<td>Targeted goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-swing</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cross-Type</td>
<td>Targeted goods</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before describing our strategy for evaluating these different expectations we provide a brief background on the Thai political context, germane to the 2011 elections. From this review we derive several additional, Thailand-specific expectations.

3. The Thai Political Landscape in 2011

In 2006 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his ruling Thai Rak Thai party were ousted in a military coup. Thaksin’s ouster ushered in a period of intense political instability. The supporters of Thaksin rallied around their ousted leaders, and, wearing red-shirts, demanded that he be restored to power. At the same time, the “yellow-shirts” continued to protest against Thaksin’s return to political life, and demanded that his political allies be excluded from government. Protests and occupations by these two groups severely disrupted life in Bangkok and shut down significant portions of the city between 2006 and 2010.

The protests and social unrest reflected, in part, some fundamental changes to Thai politics. Over the course of the 2000s a political cleavage that had simmered beneath the surface for decades gradually came to the surface. The nature of the cleavage has been described as both a class cleavage as well as a regional cleavage. On the one side were relatively poor voters concentrated in the North and Northeast of Thailand. Numerically a majority, this set of voters had often been both politically and economically marginalized over the course of Thailand’s history—some Thais hold stereo-typical views of Northeasterners as coarse and backward. On the other side were middle class and well-to-do voters, concentrated in Bangkok and the South of Thailand. This division had long existed in Thailand, but it had never directly mapped onto partisan politics. That changed after 1997. Thai Rak Thai’s policies, while universal in their design, none-the-less disproportionately benefited the relatively poorer populations in the North and Northeast. The combination of
these policies and enhanced incentives for party-oriented voting under the 1997 constitution, began to transform what had been an atomized electorate in the North and Northeast into a partisan electorate—one which was strongly behind Thaksin and his party, and which, when voting as a block, was a numeric majority. In short, this social cleavage had become partisan in a way Thailand had never before seen (Hicken and Selway 2012, Hicken 2013).

The 2006 coup helped crystallize and catalyze this growing division. Thaksin’s opponents rejoiced at his ouster. His supporters, however, rallied in red, and expressed their support by voting against the military-designed and -backed constitution in 2007, and in favor of the successor party to Thai Rak Thai in elections later the same year. When that party was victorious at the polls, the yellow shirts went back to the streets, occupying the Government House and eventually the airport until a ruling by the Constitutional Court disbanded the ruling party and removed the prime minister from office. It was then the red-shirts’ turn to protest, culminating in the violence of Spring 2010.

This was the context and history when Thai voters went to the polls in 2011. In light of the changes described above we are interested in what motivated the Thai electorate when selecting candidates for national elections. For decades the answer given by most scholars of Thailand has been ties with individual candidates—ties formed from lasting patron-client relationships as well as the targeted delivery goods, services, and cash (often in the form of vote buying). Party affiliation or policy promises played little role in voters’ decisions. If this view is correct and still pertains, it suggests that we should find voters primarily interested in targeted goods regardless of the electoral rules. However, as just described the Thai polity has undergone enormous change in the past decade with regional cleavages extending into the party system and the Thai electorate developing a preference for nationally-oriented, popular policies (Hicken and Selway 2012). This suggests that public goods should now have
greater weight in voter preferences, and that we should see voters responding favorably to candidates who make such appeals. By contrast, if, as some have claimed, the nature of voter preferences has largely remained unchanged, then we should observe voters, particularly those in the North and Northeast, expressing strong preferences for targeted goods. Finally, given the especially strong level of polarization between the two main political parties in Thailand (Pheu Thai (PT) and the Democrat Party), it is quite likely that we also find strong interactions with party ID. Unlike previous eras, where most voters had no stable party ID to speak of, we expect party ID to directly shape voter’s evaluations of candidates. We do not have specific predictions about how voters will respond to partisan cues other than treating co-partisans differently than the candidates from other parties. Table 2 summarizes the various arguments concerning electoral rules and public goods provision in Thailand. Note that the first three do not predict any difference based on electoral rules. The first two predict broad country-level trends, while the third predicts differences between regions. The fourth argument might interact with any of the other arguments from Tables 1 and 2.

[Table 2 about here]
Table 2: Voter Preferences in the Thai Political Landscape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PR candidates</th>
<th>Constituency candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Patron-Client</td>
<td>Targeted goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nationally-Oriented Parties</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North/Northeast</td>
<td>Targeted goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Thailand</td>
<td>Broad PGs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Partisan</td>
<td>Treat co-partisans differently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Description of Survey Experiment

The foregoing theoretical and historical discussion has highlighted eight competing arguments about how voters will respond to candidates from different electoral tiers. To evaluate them, we administered a survey experiment to a nationally-representative, random sample of Thai voters in the two weeks preceding the 2011 national elections. The survey was administered by the Assumption Business Administration College (ABAC) Poll Research Center at Assumption University, Thailand’s largest and most-respected polling organization, using a multi-stage random sample identical to the one they use in all their nationally-representative polls. Our final sample size was 8,455 individuals. Respondents were interviewed in person by a trained interviewer. In addition to our experimental manipulation, we asked a battery of personal demographic questions and basic political questions. The sampling methodology and sample questions can be found in the appendix).

One of the strengths of randomized experiments like the one we undertake in this study is their ability to identify causal variables. This is especially important in the study of electoral rules where what we know comes from observational data that has established strong correlations, but which leaves us short of knowing whether electoral rules causally influence politician and/or voter behavior. It could be that countries that choose PR electoral rules differ in many ways from those that choose majoritarian ones.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} A dataset containing all data and supporting materials contained in this paper will be made available from the author’s web upon publication.

Qualitative accounts are arguably better at uncovering causal relationships through process-tracing and in-depth country knowledge, but likewise rely on strong counterfactual assumptions. Through the randomization process, we get as close as we can to the counterfactual ideal, assigning in equal proportions the numerous unknown ways in which subjects can differ randomly across control and treatment groups. Of course, the difficulty in an experimental design to test the causal effect of electoral rules is that we cannot manipulate which electoral rules a country uses. We thus take advantage of the existing division in electoral rules within a single country that all voters are exposed to and prime them to think about candidates elected under each rule.

Respondents were provided with a brief description of a hypothetical candidate, and then asked whether the information makes them more or less likely to vote for that candidate. For example, here is the baseline description of the Pheu Thai party constituency candidate, which includes information on his region of residence as well as the espousal of a policy platform, but excludes regarding loyalty to the monarchy or affiliation with a mass movement (Thai text is in the appendix).

Mr. Hypothetical\textsuperscript{12} (hypothetical name) is a candidate in your constituency in the upcoming election for the Pheu Thai party. He is from the Isan region and in arguments about studies on the effect of media on citizens’ political views and party mobilization strategies on voter turnout, respectively.

\textsuperscript{12} We thought this was an amusing translation since they refer to him not only as Mr. Hypothetical, but also remind the respondent that the surname is hypothetical. This is standard practice in Thai survey work.
recent speeches has emphasized the improvement of the national health insurance scheme.

All else being equal, does the above information make you more or less likely to vote for this candidate?

Much more likely
Somewhat more likely
Somewhat less likely
Much less likely

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of multiple descriptions of the hypothetical candidate. These additional treatments were as follows:

1. Electoral Tier:
   a. “is a candidate in your constituency in the upcoming election”
   b. “is a party list candidate in the upcoming election”

2. Party:
   a. “for the Pheu Thai party”
   b. “for the Democrat party”

3. Region:
   a. “He is from Isan”
   b. “He is from Bangkok”

13 There were two additional treatments that are irrelevant to this study: social movement (He has been involved in the UDD/PAD political movements over the past few years) and monarchy (He pledges to defend the monarchy from all threats).
4. Platform:
   
   a. “has emphasized the improvement of health facilities in this province”
   
   b. “has emphasized the improvement of the national health insurance scheme”

This gives us a 2x2x2x2 design, or 16 cells. The cell size for each treatment averages roughly 520 cases, a number that ensures a good degree of statistical power and the ability to look at subgroups of respondents. A randomization check revealed some unbalance across the cells, but following Mutz and Pemantle (2013) we report the results from the pure experimental conditions; however, the results do not change when we control for the covariates.14

Demand for Local Health Infrastructure

Our Platform treatment is designed to distinguish between demands for broad public goods (national health insurance scheme) and more narrowly targeted pork (improvements to local health facilities). Thai politicians have a history of providing pork/local public goods in the form clinics and hospitals (see Selway 2011), so it is conceivable that preferences over health policy could simply be a product of existing local infrastructure. It could be that voters in areas with a high need for health facilities interpret the policy platforms differently from those where the health infrastructure is good—after all, improving local health facilities is not inconsistent with a broad, nationally-oriented public goods policy that aims to improve hospitals where the need is greatest. However, we maintain that, given the strong association of hospital building with pork in Thailand, voters take this as a cue for the type of politician they face.

14 See supplementary appendix for the balancing analysis and robustness tests.
To check that our policy platform treatment worked as intended, we differentiate districts based on need for local health infrastructure. We use data on the population-to-bed ratio from the Thai Ministry of Public Health and create a dummy of low and high infrastructure districts by dividing the sample at the mean.\(^{15}\) We find no difference in terms of policy preference between voters from areas with high levels of health infrastructure versus those from low-level areas.\(^{16}\)

Before turning to our main results we are interested to see the extent to which the survey results correspond to the final election results. On average voters rate PT candidates higher than they do Democrat candidates (row 1 in Table 3)—which is consistent with the final election tally which gave PT 44 percent of the constituency tier vote, compared with 32 percent for the Democrat Party. As should be the case, voters who identify as PT supporters strongly prefer PT candidates over Democrat candidates (row 2) and the reverse is true for Democrat voters (row 3).

\[\text{Table 3 about here}\]

\(^{15}\) The Thai MOPH does not provide information at the district level, only at the provincial level, but we know that rural districts have much lower levels of infrastructure, so we multiply the beds-per-population number by two for non-municipal districts. We get similar results without taking the urbanization of the district into consideration.

\(^{16}\) Voters from districts with high infrastructure are further indifferent when we differentiate based on whether constituency MPs or party list MPs are giving these platforms. We think this is due to the influence of the Northeast, which is heavily Pheu Thai, which makes up just under half of all low-infrastructure districts.
Table 3. Candidate Party Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PT Candidate</th>
<th>Democrat Candidate</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff ≠ 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pheu Thai Voters</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democrat Voters</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Results

To investigate the effect of electoral rules on voter preferences we perform simple difference of means tests between those who received the constituency candidate treatment and those who received the party list candidate treatment. Table 4 displays the results. We begin with the base models in rows 1 and 4, which display the difference in means for the whole sample. These models do not take into account the candidate’s platform or party affiliation and therefore are simply tests of whether voters prefer their local candidate to an essentially randomly selected PR list candidate, or prefer pork to public goods. Similar to US voters, Thai voters do show a slight preference for their local candidate (Model 1). They are 2.4% more likely to vote for a candidate, holding all else equal, simply by knowing he is running in their constituency compared to running on the PR national list.\textsuperscript{17} Thai voters also show a slight preference for pork, but the difference is very small and statistically insignificant (Model 4). This suggests that the view of Thai voters as primarily concerned with narrowly targeted goods and services no longer holds, (if it ever did).

[Table 4 about here]

\textsuperscript{17} We calculate this by dividing the value in the difference column by the value in the combined column.
Table 4. Effects of Electoral Rule and Policy Platform Treatments, All Voters

|   | Constituency candidate | Party list candidate | Combined | Difference | Pr(|diff| >0) |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|----------|------------|-------------|
| 1 | Full sample            | 2.58                 | 2.52     | 2.55       | 0.06        | 0.003       |
| 2 | Pork Platform          | 2.57                 | 2.54     | 2.55       | 0.03        | 0.166       |
| 3 | Public Goods Platform  | 2.59                 | 2.50     | 2.54       | 0.09        | 0.002       |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff≠0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Constituency candidate</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Party list candidate</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of Models 2 and 3 are the supportive of the idea that voters view the role of party list and constituency MPs differently, but this does not translate into greater support for candidates who signal office type. Instead, it appears that voters prefer candidate who make promises counter their type. For example, when both candidates espouse a pork platform (Model 2) the difference between constituency and party list candidates falls by 50 percent. It appears that the promise of pork helps voters better connect with the party list candidate to the extent that voters no longer distinguish between which tier a candidate is running on. Model 3, provides further evidence of counter-type preferences from votes.

When both candidates run on a public goods platform voters strongly favor the constituency candidate. Specifically, support for the constituency candidate is 3.5% more than support for the party list candidate making the exact same promises of public goods. This is consistent with the argument that while public goods promises are expected of party list candidates, promising public goods sets a local candidate apart and boosts his/her favorability. Models 5 and 6 show these counter-type dynamics from a slightly different angle. Model 5 tells us that voters have a slight preference for constituency candidates that run on a public goods platform. The difference is not statistically significant, however. Model 6 confirms that voters prefer party list candidates that run on pork platforms.

Thus far there is little evidence that voters judge constituency candidates based on their promise to bring home the pork and party list candidates on a policy-oriented platform. But that is not to say that nature of the electoral system has no bearing on voter preferences, as the contamination argument asserts. Rather, the results are consistent with the idea that voters do expect a certain policy from each type of candidate, but they like candidates better when they observe promises of the other type of policy. But what happens when we control for the level of competitiveness in a given district?
Swing/ Non-swing Districts

Do voters in swing districts have different policy preferences than ones in which the victor wins with ease? To answer this question we use actual constituency-level data and compute a measure that divides the second-placed candidate’s vote tally by the victor’s. We then divide the sample in half at the 50th percentile.\(^{18}\) As the swing hypothesis predicted, the competitive districts display opposite policy preferences from the non-competitive ones. Specifically, competitive districts prefer pork and non-competitive ones prefer public goods (Models 1 and 2 in Table 5). Voters in competitive districts while preferring pork from both types of candidates, are especially keen to see party list candidates promise targeted goods to their district (the result is statistically insignificant for the constituency candidate). This is precisely what we would expect from voters in swing districts. In close races they reward party list candidates who promise targeted goods in addition to/instead of broader public goods. At the same time, voters in non-swing constituencies prefer candidates who make promises of public goods, particularly when those candidates are constituency candidates.\(^ {19}\)

\(^{18}\) For robustness, we also divide the sample into quartiles. The results are essentially the same, except that the least competitive districts are indifferent between policy types.

\(^{19}\) We suspect this was likely different in pre-1997 Thailand where MPs each had development funds they directly controlled, whether part of the government or opposition. Under such a scenario even voters in non-competitive districts could still expect targeted benefits (Nishizaki 2006). Post 1997 those funds were eliminated and government/ruling party began to expert more centralized control over targeted spending and as a result the
So, to summarize we find substantial support for swing/non-swing argument. But we also observe additional support for counter-type argument. Within swing constituencies it is party list candidates, normally associated with public goods, which gain the most by promising to deliver targeted benefits. Similarly, in non-swing constituencies it is constituency candidates that get the biggest benefit from promising to provide public goods.

[Table 5 about here]
Table 5. Effects of Electoral Rule and Policy Platform Treatments, By District Competitiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff ≠ 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Swing</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-swing</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Constituencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Constituency</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Party list</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Swing Constituencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Constituency</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Party list</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party ID

We now investigate the effect of party ID. We expect the results presented above, averaged across all voters and candidates, mask interesting party dynamics. We can imagine in the US, for example, that Democrat voters might hold Republican candidates to a higher public goods standard than they do Democrat candidates, and vice versa. The average effect, therefore, would be zero, but it would be masking what was really going on. Similarly, we break down our results by both the hypothetical candidate’s party affiliation and the voters’ partisanship, focusing on the two largest parties in the 2011 election, Pheu Thai and the Democrat Party. Together these parties captured nearly 85 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives.

Models 1-4 of Table 6 show the results based on candidate party affiliation, Pheu Thai or Democrat. Since the models do not take voter partisanship into consideration, we are not surprised at the lack of statistically significant differences here. Voters only seem to respond to the party list Democrat, slightly preferring when he espouses a pork platform (Model 4). The remaining models further break down the results based on voter partisanship.

[Table 6 about here]
Table 6. Effects of Electoral Rule and Policy Platform Treatments, By Voter Party ID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Type</th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff≠0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pheu Thai Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We begin with Pheu Thai voters in Models 5-8. We see first that Pheu Thai voters tend to prefer constituency candidates who focus beyond the their narrow constituency and offer up more general policy proposals. They particularly like it when constituent candidates from their own party allude to national health care policy. It is interesting that voters seem to find these policy platforms credible. They expect that individual candidates, as a member of what has become a relatively disciplined party with an established reputation in the area of health policy, can deliver on those policy promises. This represents a significant shift from past norms (Hicken 2007). Pheu Thai voters also prefer constituency candidates from the opposing Democrat party who offer public goods, although they favor them less than candidates from their own party as we would expect. Finally, it appears that, in contrast to the full sample of voters, Pheu Thai voters do not reward party list candidates from any party who offer up particularistic benefits. In fact, for party list candidates it appears that the type of appeal matters very little. For Pheu Thai voters, then, what party list candidates offer seems to make little difference, while constituency candidates can get a boost by pledging to support broad policy initiatives.20

In Models 9-12, we see that Democrat voters behave somewhat differently—in fact, nearly opposite of the Pheu Thai voters. As expected, Democrat voters prefer Democrat candidates, whether list or constituency, over Pheu Thai candidates. However, in contrast to Pheu Thai voters Democrats prefer party lists candidates from both parties to offer up promises of locally-targeted goods. This is interesting given the longstanding reputation of

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20 When we break down the results by region instead of party we find similar results. The Northeast region, heavy supporters of Pheu Thai, prefer public goods, especially from their constituency MPs.
the Democrat party and its voters as the most policy-oriented of any in Thailand, at least prior to the rise of the Thai Rak Thai party.\textsuperscript{21} Democrat voters also seem innocuous to the kind of appeal that constituency candidates make.

In sum, both Pheu Thai and Democrat voters seem to pursue cross-type strategies, but in different ways. Pheu Thai voters like their constituency candidates to promise public goods, while Democrat voters like their party list candidates to promise targeted goods.

What happens if we break these same results down by constituency competitiveness (see Appendix)? Overall, voters in swing constituencies tend to prefer candidates who offer pork and voters in non-swing constituencies prefer candidates who offer public goods. But when we break voters down by party affiliation most of the differences wash away, with two exceptions. 1) Pheu Thai voters in swing districts prefer Democrat constituency candidates who promise public goods. 2) Democrat voters in non-swing constituencies prefer party list candidates from either party who promise targeted benefits.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we explored the effect of electoral rules on voter preference for public goods policies. Using a survey experiment in Thailand’s mixed-member electoral system just prior to the 2011 national elections, we varied several characteristics of a hypothetical candidate amongst a nationally representative random sample of Thai voters. We found evidence that electoral rules matter. Specifically, we found that candidates that espouse a policy uncharacteristic of a candidate running under a given set of electoral rules tend to be favored by voters. However, the way in which this plays out depends on whether voters are

\textsuperscript{21} See for example McCargo and Ukrit (2005)
from a swing district or not. In swing districts, voters tend to prefer targeted policies, especially from party list candidates. Voters in non-swing districts, conversely, prefer promised of public goods from constituency candidates. Both these results seem to support previous politician-centered accounts regarding how electoral rules affect public goods provision. This cross-type strategy by voters is also contingent on party ID. Pheu Thai voters prefer constituency candidates who promise public goods, while Democrat voters prefer party list candidates who promise targeted goods.

All this represents a mere first cut at this question of the effect of electoral rules on the voter-politician accountability link. Future studies should certainly try to distinguish between core expectations about candidates from marginal dynamics. Our experiment specifically asked if, “all else being equal”, the information we presented would make them more or less likely to vote for a hypothetical candidate. However, our interpretation of the results still relies heavily on a core assumption about what the voters are holding equal, i.e. they expect/prefer public goods from PR list MP’s and pork from constituency MP’s. This seems crucial to unpack going forward.

The field would certainly benefit from replicating the experiment in a different country. Mixed-member systems might behave differently in different contexts. The literature on contamination effects certainly suggests that we might expect one of the two electoral rules to dominate in some country. The introduction of a PR party list tier seems to have had a strong effect in Thailand. Yet, we still see evidence of preference for pork in both swing constituencies and by Democrat voters.

Lastly, the results on party ID are likely to be Thailand specific. Several factors could be at play here. We have already discussed the association of broad, national policies with a
single party in Thailand (Pheu Thai), but the high level of party polarization, strong regional voting patterns and even the size of the largest party could contribute unique results.
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Electoral Rules, Public Goods Experiment

Selway, Hicken, & Kannika


Appendix

Table A1. Effects of Electoral Rule & Policy Platform Treatments, By Voter Party ID, Swing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff≠0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Voters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.70</td>
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<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
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<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.53</td>
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<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pheu Thai Voters</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat Voters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2. Electoral Rule & Policy Platform Treatments, By Voter Party ID,

Non-swing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Voters</th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff ≠ 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pheu Thai Voters</th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff ≠ 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
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<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrat Voters</th>
<th>Pork Platform</th>
<th>PG Platform</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Pr(diff ≠ 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Pheu Thai</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency, Democrat</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list, Democrat</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Question Wording**

Mr. Hypothetical (hypothetical name) is a candidate in your constituency in the upcoming election for the Pheu Thai party. He is from the Isan region and in recent speeches has emphasized the improvement of the national health insurance scheme.

All else being equal, does the above information make you more or less likely to vote for this candidate?

- Much more likely
- Somewhat more likely
- Somewhat less likely
- Much less likely

นายสมมติ (นามสมมติ) เป็นผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้ง ส.ส.ในพื้นที่เขตเลือกตั้งของคุณ ซึ่งเป็นผู้สมัครจากพรรคเพื่อไทย เขามาจากภาคอิสาน และได้ปราศรัยที่เน้นถึงการพัฒนาโครงการหลักประกันสุขภาพแห่งชาติ ถ้าคุณสมมติคิดว่าผู้สมัครคนนี้มีคุณสมบัติที่ทำให้คุณเลือกผู้สมัครคนนี้มากน้อยเพียงใด ต้องเลือก

[ ] 1. เป็นไปได้มากที่จะเลือกผู้สมัครคนนี้ตามข้อมูลที่ให้มานะ

[ ] 2. เป็นไปได้ค่อนข้างมากที่จะเลือกผู้สมัครคนนี้

[ ] 3. เป็นไปได้ค่อนข้างน้อย

[ ] 4. เป็นไปได้น้อยมากที่จะเลือกผู้สมัครคนนี้