 |
|
|
| Details are as follows: | |
|
|
|
|
The Cadbury Committee Recommendations, Corporate Performance and Top Management Turnover |
|
| Speaker: |
Prof. Jay Dahya Purdue University USA |
| Date: | May 4, 2001 (Friday) |
| Abstract: | In 1992, the Cadbury Committee issued the Code of Best Practice which recommends that boards of UK corporations include at least three outside directors and that the positions of chairman and CEO be held by different individuals. The underlying presumption was that these recommendations would lead to improved board oversight. We empirically analyze the relationship between CEO turner and corporate performance. CEO turnover increased following issuance of the Code; the negative relationship between CEO turnover and performance became stronger following the Code's issuance; and the increase in sensitivity of turnover to performance was concentrated among firms that adopted the Code. |
| Presentation: | -- Download (pdf) -- |
|
|
|
|
Incentive Contracting versus Ownership Reforms: Evidence from China's Township and Village Enterprises |
|
| Speaker: |
Prof. Chun Chang University of Minnesota USA |
| Date: | May
9, 2001 (Wednesday) |
| Abstract: | We use a unique data set to study the implications of introducing managerial incentives and, in addition to incentives, better defined ownership for a firm's financial performance. The data set traces the ten-year history of 80 Chinese rural enterprises, known as township and village enterprises. During this period, these originally (mostly) community owned, local government controlled socialist collective firms were first allowed to introduce managerial incentive contracts and then to change to ownership forms of more clearly defined income and control rights. The study finds that introducing managerial incentives had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on these firms' performance measured by accounting return on assets or return on equity. It also finds that the performance is significantly better under ownership forms of better-defined rights than under community ownership even when the latter is supplemented with managerial incentive contracts. The findings shed lights on some important theoretical and policy issues. |
| Presentation: | -- Download (pdf) -- |
|
|
|
|
Investment Banking and Securities Issuance |
|
| Speaker: |
Prof. Jay Ritter University of Florida USA |
| Date: | May
16, 2001 (Wednesday) |
| Abstract: |
This Chapter analyses the securities issuance process, largely taking the choice of what security to offers as given. Extensive attention is devoted to the controversies surrounding long-run returns on companies issuing equity, including both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). For IPOs, attention is also devoted to the mechanisms for selling IPOs, where considerable variation exists in global practices. Theories and evidence regarding the first-day returns on IPOs are also covered. |
| Presentation: | -- Download Table of Content (pdf) -- Full Text is Available Upon Request |
|
|
|
|
Liquidity Risk |
|
| Speaker: |
Prof. Robert Webb University of Virginia USA |
| Date: | May
30, 2001 (Wednesday) |
| Abstract: | -- Upcomming -- |
| Presentation: | -- Download (pdf) -- |
|
|
|
| Time: | 2:30pm - 4:00pm |
| Venue: |
SCOPE Executive Training
Room I (SET 1) |
| Fee: | -- nil -- |
| All are Welcome | |
|
Email:
rf@plink.cityu.edu.hk
|
|
|
Designed
for
Faculty of Business
|
|
- Copyright & All Rights Reserved 2001- |